

THREAT MODELING  
**CONNECT**

**THREAT 20**  
**MODCON 23**

THREAT MODELING IS FOR EVERYONE



# The Threats To Our Community

By Avi Douglen



**THREAT20  
MODCON23**

**Threat  
Modeling**



**Community  
Building**

**Secure Community**



# I am... Avi Douglen

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


Founding Member



Co-Author, TM Manifesto





# Lightweight Value Chain Analysis

WHY are we working on this?

HOW do we get the value from this?

WHAT do we do to ensure that happens?


# Wardley Map

Maps value chain

Anchored on  
user needs

Movement as  
evolution

Can spot patterns of  
likely weakness



# Threat Modeling is for Everyone...

You.

Everyone.

Anyone who is concerned about the  
privacy, safety, and security of their system.

- *Threat Modeling Manifesto*





Threat Modeling is ABOUT Everyone!

Let's talk  
COMMUNITY!

# What IS “community”?

a feeling of fellowship

sharing common attitudes, interests, and goals

having a particular characteristic in common









What We Owe  
To Each Other

A. SCANLON

# Community Principles

**Follow the rules**

**Help each other**

**Everyone contributes**

**All members are important**

# Modeling a Community

*Instead of data flows...*


**Value flow**

**Contributions**


**Benefits**

**Power dynamics**







# Wardley Map of a Community




# Wardley Map of a Community




# Wardley Map of a Community



# Wardley Map of a Community



## Wardley Map of a Community



# Individuals as Components

**Some are vulnerable**

**Some don't follow the rules**

**Some people are not supportive**

**"Community Insider" Threats**

**STRIDE-by-person**

**“All Threat Models are wrong,  
some are useful”**

*- George Box (kind of)*

**Accept that it’s wrong,  
focus on the usefulness**



## S.T.R.I.D.E.

Spoofing → Identity

Tampering → Integrity

Repudiation → Provability

Information Disclosure → Confidentiality

Denial of Service → Availability

Elevation of Privileges → Authority

# **Content Warning!**

***[Wide variety of threatening scenarios]***

# Spoofting: Attacking Identity

- Claiming expertise you don't have
- Stealing credit for work and ideas
- Misgendering / Deadnaming
- Identity injection
- “GOOD GUY” pretense / Grooming

# Tampering: Attacking Integrity



**Vendor control**  
**Misdirection of funds**  
**Misinformation**  
**DeepFakes**  
**Mansplaining**

# Repudiation: Attacking Provability

Lack of transparency

Gaslighting

Weaponized banter

Discounting lived experience

**DARVO**

*deny, attack, reverse victim and offender*

# **Information Disclosure: Attacking Secrecy**

**Outing**

**Doxing**

**Stalking**

**Sharing nonconsensual photos**

# Denial of Service: Attacking Access



Exclusion

Gatekeeping

Discrimination

Flooding designated spaces

Microaggressions (DDoS)

# **Elevation of Privilege: Attacking Consent**

**Harassment**

**Unwanted physical contact**

**Violence and assault**

**Abuse of Power**

**Serial misbehavior**

**Escalating abuse**



# Threat Modeling Best Practices

A culture of [..] fixing [..] issues [..]

- *Threat Modeling Manifesto*



# Countermeasures

## *Preventive Controls*

- ❑ Banning bad actors
- ❑ Remove risky activities
- ❑ Mental health support

## *Detective Controls*

- ❑ Monitoring
- ❑ Situational awareness
- ❑ Trustworthy volunteers


# Countermeasures


## *Administrative*

- ❑ Code of Conduct
- ❑ Process & Policy
- ❑ IH playbooks
- ❑ Consistency of results

## *Strategic / Environmental*

- ❑ Diverse community
- ❑ Cultural norms
- ❑ Shared values
- ❑ Community bonds





“If you look  
for **the helpers,**  
you’ll know that  
**there’s hope.”**

- FRED ROGERS

**Allies listen.**

**Allies speak up.**  
*Be persistent.*

**Allies help everyone be heard and  
amplify the marginalized**



**Allies use their power,  
privilege, & authority for good**

**Allies work in public to effect change**  
*and in private too*

**Allies insist on proper security controls**  
*(e.g. CoC, DEI policies, more diversity, etc)*


**Allies don't demand cookies**  
*(or respect, or attention)*



**Allies focus on harm reduction**  
*and center the safety of the survivors*

**Allies will expel known abusers  
and threat actors**


# 1% initiate ~3/4 of all conflict



Stanford study, 2018

<https://snap.stanford.edu/conflict/>

# Allies hold each other accountable *and themselves*





**Allies know when to show up  
and when to shut up**

Sexism  
Racism  
Homophobia  
Transphobia

Islamophobia  
Classism  
Colonialism  
Culturalism

Ageism  
Fatphobia  
Ugly tax  
Beauty tax

## Allyship is *INTERSECTIONAL*

Queerphobia  
Antisemitism  
Anti-religious  
Anti-secular

Ableism  
Anti-autism  
Anti-neurodiversity  
...

Child-blessed  
Child-free  
Dietary  
Alcohol-free

**Allies can get tired.  
Allies will make mistakes.**

**Allies accept criticism and try better.**

~~Takeaways~~

**Calls to Action**

Threat Model EVERYTHING,  
all the time!



**Secure the Community.**

**BE AN ALLY.**

**Stop Caring!**

**Start Doing.**

THREAT20  
MODCON23

Thanks for Listening!



Avi Douglen  
Bounce Security  
 @sec\_tigger



Irene Michlin

Alyssa Miller

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Rachael Lininger

Adam Shostack

Brook Schoenfeld

Nancy Gariché

Tanya Janca

Jackie Singh

Grant Ongers

Bil Corry

Dr. Magda Chelly

Dr. Kim Wuyts

Or Sahar

Josh Grossman

Vandana Verma

Reut Menashe

Keren Elazari

**Thanks to all who helped to educate me**

# End Terror. Support the Victims.

Verified charities and volunteers to support the victims

<https://GiveIsrael.org/>



**Support Israel  
On The Ground**

✓ Verified



**Israeli Children's Fund**

✓ Verified

Support Israel On The Ground

Our homeland is at risk. Immediate action is needed to ensure that our families and neighbors in Israel...

Donate


Israeli Children's Fund

Providing Israeli children who have lost one or both parents to acts of terrorism, or who have one o...

Donate



Stand with **Israel**



# Allies...

- ... listen.
- ... speak up. Be persistent
- ...help all be heard and amplify marginalized
- ... use power, privilege, & authority for good
- ... work in public & private to effect change
- ... insist on proper security controls  
(e.g. CoC, DEI policies, more diversity, etc)
- ... don't demand cookies, respect, attention
- ... focus on harm reduction, center survivors
- ... will expel known abusers & threat actors
- ... hold themselves, each other accountable
- ... know when to show up, when to shut up
- ... are INTERSECTIONAL
- ... accept criticism and try better.