






# HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE FOR THREAT MODELING

Michael Bernhardt






# PART 1- REVIEW OUR AMBITION: HOW DO WE TEACH PRACTITIONERS TO DO IT?

Look at what guidance is  
already there

Look at how we guide as a  
community

See how it relates to the Threat  
Modeling Hitchhiker Guide





## Kihon

- Attack Trees
- STRIDE
- DREAD
- Misuse Cases
- Data Flow Diagrams / TAM
- ...

## Kata

- Books (Adam, Brook, Izar, ...)
- Sample Threat Models
- Resource compilations / Blogs / Newsletters
- Papers (SANS, ...)
- [NIST Standard](#) (Draft Status)
- Communities

## Do

- [Historic Microsoft Blog](#)
- [Threat Modeling Manifesto](#)
- [Adam's Jenga paper](#)

# TMC – DID WE DO A GOOD JOB?



[Word Cloud Generator \(jasondavies.com\)](http://jasondavies.com)


# HITCHHIKER'S GUIDE FOR FAILING THREAT MODELING



The Security Expert



[Go to blog article](#)



The Developer

# PART 2- REVIEW OUR AMBITION: HOW DO WE GET THE BUY-IN FOR PRACTITIONERS TO DO IT?

How do we enable practitioners to  
get the buy-in?

What does the expert community  
see as the missing parts for better  
acceptance?



# PILLARS OF A TM PROGRAM - ADAM'S JENGA MODEL



[The Jenga View of Threat Modeling](#)



# TMC – DID WE DO A GOOD JOB?



[Word Cloud Generator \(jasondavies.com\)](http://jasondavies.com)



Do

## TO WHICH EXTEND DOES THE FRAMEWORK PROVIDE PRACTITIONERS TO GET THE BUY-IN FROM THE *BUSINESS*?

- Basic concepts (Attack Trees, STRIDE, ...)
- Best practices
- Tools
- Reputation
- ...

How do we make it *measurable*? Which metrics/KPIs could we promote to advertise the *value* of Threat Modeling?



Do

## TO WHICH EXTEND IS THE VALUE KNOWN TO OUR *SECURITY PEERS* OUTSIDE APPSEC?

- SOC/Incident Response
- GRC
- BCM
- Network Security
- ...

What is required to make the outcome of a Threat Modeling *meaningful to other security disciplines*? What are the fine twists and enhancements that would bring it closer to their work?



” TO FIGHT IN ALL YOUR BATTLES AND WIN IS NOT THE GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT. THE BIGGEST ACHIEVEMENT IS TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHOUT HAVING TO FIGHT.

[Kam Leung, Kung-Fu Master]

- Kim Wuyts, KU Leuven
- Nick Kirtley, Aristiun
- Koen Yskout, KU Leuven
- Izar Tarandach, Datadog
- Sebastien Deleersnyder, Toreon
- Jan-Philipp Schmitz, Capgemini
- Jasmin Mair, Leica Microsystems
- Grant Ongers, OWASP/SecureDelivery
- Brook Schoenfield
- Maurício Ariza, SAP
- Juliane Reimann / Joshua Holmes, SecureIO

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THREAT MODELING  
**CONNECT**

**THREAT 20**  
**MODCON 23**

THREAT MODELING IS FOR EVERYONE