

Global Threat Model Together Day - APAC Session

October 23, 2025

The first community-led threat modeling bootcamp



Global Threat Model Together Day - EMEA Session

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Global Threat Model Together Day - Americas Session

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The first community-led threat modeling bootcamp



Welcome to the Threat Modeling Connect (TMC) Community!




Who we are

TMC is an open threat modeling community brought together by IriusRisk, with a mission to secure the software and systems that power the modern world by Threat Modeling.



TMC Local Chapters

10 active chapters around the world and 1 coming up in New York City



**Community and
event sponsor**

IriusRisk

Event Partner


DCNNTM

DC'S NEXT TOP THREAT MODEL

Photo time!

Camera on (/off)?

Name like you
want it published?



Purpose: Event
reports, social
media,
advertisements



Agenda

01 – Today's Toolkit

02 – Playground / System Model

03 – Threat Model Together

04 – Insight Sharing

05 – Final Announcements

Today's Toolkit



What is Threat Modeling?

Threat modeling is analyzing representations of a system to highlight concerns about security and privacy characteristics.



THREAT MODELING MANIFESTO

<https://www.threatmodelingmanifesto.org/>

Chris Romeo's Rule

[We are] not allowed to talk about Threat Modeling for more than 30 minutes, until people have to threat model.



<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oioLnkQeVek&t=876s>

Shostack's 4 Question Framework for Threat Modeling



Q1 – What are we working on?

Q2 – What can go wrong?

Q3 – What are we going to do about it?

Q4 – Did we do a good job?

<https://github.com/adamshostack/4QuestionFrame>

What is a Threat, Vulnerability and a Risk?



Threat

“A Threat is an action with the potential to cause harm”

A boxer throwing a punch



Vulnerability

“A Vulnerability is a weakness that can be exploited”

The boxer not using their guard to protect themselves



Risk

“The potential impact or result when a threat exploits a vulnerability”

A boxer getting hit by a punch because they are not protecting themselves



Threat & Vulnerability → Risk



Go threat model: A day at the beach...



Today's Toolkit \ What can go wrong?



Today's Toolkit

- \ What can go wrong?
- \ Security



STRIDE Threat Categories

S – Spoofing

T – Tampering

R – Repudiation

I – Information Disclosure

D – Denial of Service

E – Elevation of Privilege

- By Praerit Garg & Loren Kohnfelder, 1999
- Six threat categories
- Undermine six desired properties of a system

STRIDE Threat Categories

- presented in a different order
- images from ThoughtWorks
(licensed Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 -
<https://thoughtworksinc.github.io/sensible-security-conversations/>)

Why reordered?

- First three correspond to popular CIA Triad
 - Information Disclosure ↔ Confidentiality
 - Tampering ↔ Integrity
 - Denial of Service ↔ Availability
- Two about getting there
 - Spoofing ↔ Authentication
 - Elevation of Privilege ↔ Authorization
- One about getting away
 - Repudiation

STRIDE - Information Disclosure

- receiving information you were not supposed to see
- undermines Confidentiality
- Do we protect our secrets?



S**IRIDE** - Tampering

- manipulating data / communication / code
- undermines Integrity
- Can someone mess with our data or insert malicious snippets?



STRIDE - Denial of Service

- making service unavailable for legit use
- undermines Availability
- Is our service up, even if someone wants to disrupt it?




STRIDE - Spoofing

- pretending to be someone / something else
- undermines Authentication (Who are you?)
- Who can do this? How do we know it's really them?



STRIDE - Elevation of Privilege

- achieving more than you should be able to do
- undermines Authorization (What can you do?)
- How do we enforce our permission system? Can it be bypassed?



STRIDE - Repudiation

- getting away with “I didn’t do it” (after a malicious action)
- undermines Verifiability
- Can we detect & attribute critical actions?



STRIDE (reordered)



STRIDE per Element

- Combine system components with the STRIDE categories
- More easily elicit threats because of focus

Today's Toolkit

- \ What can go wrong?
- \ Privacy



Privacy



- We are not only processing data...

Privacy

```
 1001      01110
010110    011001
110101    101010
1001      01110

11101010  1010101
10111001011 10001110010
10001011000 101011001111
001110101001010101010111
1101110010110010001110010
1101010110 0110 0110011110
1001110101 0101 1010101110
011110010 1001 0011100 01
11 1010110 1110 10110011 100
10 1110101 10 01010101 100 1100
111110 00011100 10 1100
101 10 1101100111 01 101
111 01 1010101011 10100
111 10 00 100 111001
101 10 01 011 010110
111 01 10 101 01000
111 10 00 100 11001
101 10 01 011 01 1
111 01 10 101 01 0
```

- We are not only processing data...
- It's about people!

Data subjects have rights!

- Data subjects want and deserve
 - adequate, minimal data about them collected/processed for a specific purpose
 - transparency
 - control
- Curious about more?
Learn LINDDUN or checkout work of Kim Wuyts!

<https://linddun.org>

<https://www.youtube.com/@KimWuyts-privacy>

Today's Toolkit

- \ What can go wrong?
- \ Usability



Usability (ISO 9241-11:2018)

≈ how well your offer helps people achieve their goals


- Effectiveness: achieving the goal
 - Efficiency: quality ↑ cost ↓
 - Satisfaction: 
- Usability threats: Users frustrated, because they are not getting what they want from your system

<https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/en/#iso:std:iso:9241:-11:ed-2:v1:en>

Today's Toolkit \\ What are we going to do about it?



Kinds of controls




reduce likelihood

reduce harm

<https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework>

Qualitative Risk

- Not all threats are equally severe
- How likely? How bad? → Risk
- LMH risk assessment:
Judge likelihood & impact
Low / Medium / High;
get severity from matrix
- Before / After Principle:
Improve severe risks with controls
until they are acceptable



Today, talk is cheap!

- Normally, risk & feasibility matter a lot.
- There's different approaches.

<https://threatmodelingconnect.discourse.group/t/most-awesome-risk-assessment-style/889>

- We don't actually want to secure that playground system.
- Let's only address risk & feasibility when it's fun!

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Playground / System Model



System for today:

Ordering food in the Global Threat Model Theme Park



Scenario

After a successful ThreatModCon DC, Shuning wants to open her first “Global Threat Model Theme Park”.

All things awesome and threat modeled, of course!


We are in charge of building the food ordering experience! We have an early version of the design under construction.

System description

- New upcoming theme park has multiple restaurants.
- Ways to order:
 1. Traditional: Inside restaurant at a kiosk, have waiter deliver food
 2. Fancy: Inside the park with an app, have drones deliver with GPS / face recognition



Data (& Food) Flow Diagram



What could possibly go wrong?



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

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Threat Model Together





Method cheat sheet




Privacy: Minimality,
Transparency, Control

Usability: help users achieve
their goals



Agile Threat Modeling Mini Sprints



1. First sprint:  Threats
2. Get together
3. Second sprint:  Mitigations
4. Insight sharing

First sprint

- Topic: 🌩️ Threats
- Decide your focus!
- Elicit threats
(Brainstorm / STRIDE / Privacy / Usability)
- Challenge: Also find one funny/#silly threat 😜
- Go threat model!
- Back in 30 minutes

Get together

- What was your most interesting threat?

Second sprint

- Topic: 🌂 Mitigations
- 🔑🛡️ Protect? 📡 Detect?
🧯 Respond? 🩹 Recover?
- New follow-up threats from mitigations?
- [Go threat model!](#)
- Back in 30 minutes

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Insight Sharing



Insight Sharing

- How did the exercise work for you?
- What did you learn today?

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Final Announcements



Upcoming event

ThreatModCon 2025 USA

Nov 7-8, 2025
Washington DC

—

The ONLY threat modeling conference on the planet & biggest annual gathering of the TMC community! ❤️



Upcoming event

TMC Vienna Meetup

Oct 30, 2025, 5-8PM
@ÖBB Open Innovation Factory

—
Hands-on threat modeling workshop, quantitative
threat modeling seminar, happy hour!



Save the date

Hackathon 2026

February 1-27, 2026
Virtual

—
TMC's favorite spring tradition is back!
Registration opens in January. Limited seats available.



SOTM 2025-2026

Community Survey opens next month!

Have your say and help shape the next SOTM report.
Stay tuned for updates coming November 2025!

2025-2026
**State of Threat
Modeling Report**

Community Survey

Now's the time to make your
voice heard

Survey closes 12.31.2025

THREAT MODELING
CONNECT



Member newsletter

**Events, content,
projects news &
so much more**

[threatmodelingconnect.com/
join-the-community](https://threatmodelingconnect.com/join-the-community)

Newsletter



We're on Slack! 

Connecting with
fellow members
is now easier

<https://tinyurl.com/mrxydahn>

Slack

