Bird's eye view: All Team APEC 1 threats and mitigations

"MiTM between <u>#5b</u> ordering kiosk and <u>#5a</u> order processing service" €/€
 "encrypted wifi and physical lan cables to reduce impact"

Respond with manual delivery using waiters"

(3) "bombing" the Kiosk and make it out of order <u>#tempering</u>"

(4) "Metal detectors and X-ray to detect malicious intent."

(2) "Payment service down due internet service connecting payment service to Order Processing Service may be down." 🥩 🔝 🖫

The Have alternate internet service provider to connect to the Payment service."

"unauthorized access to Drones to control, and drop food on customers in the park
 #9" €/€

The interpolation is a second of the interpolation in the interpolation is a second of the interpolation in the in

Restrict flight routes, shutdown drone if go out from the park,"

→ "Update firmware of drone periodicity"

Change transmission channel, should be changeable, if hacked the drone

 \mathfrak{P} "#14 Poison the food"

→ "Inspect the food ingredients"

The Restricting access to the kitchen"

Bird's eye view: All Team APEC 2 threats and mitigations

 \circlearrowleft "all the databases are in the same network and can be compromised" \circlearrowleft / \circledast \circledast

¬ "#detect - check logs for auditing process"

The system (IDS) such as Zabbix"

→ "#mitigation - isolate DB to prevent lateral movement"

🗘 <u>"#Database</u> Manipulate order data, change prices or quantities" 😜 😜 / 😜

→ "#Mitigate - Implement server-side validation, use HMAC-signed requests, deploy

WAF to block malicious inputs"

(3) "Tampered/compromised mobile application used by customers during the ordering

process" € / 😜 😜

"mitigate - Code signing & certificate verification"

→ "mitigate - App integrity checks"

→ "detection - monitoring of any unusual outgoing requests containing sensitive
information to unusual domains"

🔾 "all the databases are in the same network and can be compromised" 😐 😐 / 😴

Time in the segmentation, application whitelisting, and network ACLs"

(excessive login attempts, privileged operations etc.)"

→ "detection - Enable logging for audit trailing"

— "mitigation - avoid same set of user credentials across all databases"

Time mitigation - Ensure that all databases are updated to the latest version"

¬ "Kiosk breakout" €/ © ©

mitigate - Kiosk mode, disable hotkeys, lock shell"

→ "mitigation - Whitelisted domains, disable downloads, auto-reset session"

→ "mitigate - Lock USB/ports, mount securely, CCTV"

🔾 "<u>#Server</u> - User or attacker impersonates another user" 😐 😐 / 😱 😱

"Mitigatiomn - Use OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect, enforce MFA, secure session cookies (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite), short token expiry"

🔾 <u>"#Server-Intruder</u> - Customer denies placing an order" 😱 😱 😱 / 😜 😜 — "respond- Maintain immutable logging non-repudiation via digital receipts" 🗘 "Drones signal jamming GPS" 😐 😐 / 😐 😐 — "mitigate - Jammer / spoof detection & geo-awareness" 🔾 "<u>#Database</u> - Exposure of PII or payment info" 😴 / 🔒 🔒 Time Mitigate - Encrypt at rest (AES-256), in transit (TLS 1.2+)," and detect - Implementing Database Activity Monitoring." The price is tampered with and the item is purchased for a smaller amount. #Payment" ♠ ♠ ♠ / º º Talidate input values" The Mitigate - Implement principle of least privilege (POLP) on database level Timitigate - rate limiting and behavior detection to flag order patterns." respond - Logging, monitoring, and automated detection" — "mitigate - Signed price tokens" — "mitigate - Harden APIs & authentication" 😱 <u>"#Payment</u> Gateway - Spoofed requests" 😴 Time Mitigation - Mutual TLS, signed requests, API key rotation" This is a service and payment service. "Hijacking of the network between order processing service and payment service." **6** / **4 4 4** The Mitigation - Enforcement of TLS 1.2/1.3 protocol" mitigate - Sign every payment-related payload" mitigate - Validate payment gateway responses & reconciliation via verifying the payment gateway's callback signature and expected fields. Perform real-time reconciliation: payment callback amount must match server's expected amount or trigger blocking." and the product is delivered to a different location. <u>#Server</u>" · · / · · · ? "respond - Maintain immutable logging non-repudiation" Time mitigate - Enforce End-to-End Data Integrity" Time mitigate - Fraud Detection / Business Logic Controls"

- \bigcirc "@MobileApp API -> Manipulation of order data (e.g., change item price)"
- The implemental server-side validation, use HMAC-signed requests, deploy WAF to block malicious inputs"
 - ¬ "19: food may be droped while delivering" €/ © ©
- mitigation Use tamper-evident, spill-proof, and shock-resistant containers; seal bags securely with labels or tamper seals."
- (3) "disruption of forward order function, preventing orders from reaching the kitchen"
 - Trecover setup high availability of services. Could be dual active active forward order platform."
 - → "mitigation deploy encrypted network protocol (Assuming that the forwarding system and the backend system are connected via wireless network protocol"

 → "respond prepare for manual paper option"
 - The prevention Avoid the use of wireless protocol if possible "

Bird's eye view: All Team APEC 3 threats and mitigations

All Team APEC 3 threats and mitigations
"Credit card number CVV expriy can be more sensitve data if exposed its the threat by spoofing of customer."
$\c G$ "Spoofing of customer" $\c G$ " $\c G$ " $\c G$ "To authenticate the user, by persons account in payment provider and MFA"
☐ "Collecting too much data or PII information" © ©/© © Minimizing the data usage to perform the function"
$\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ $
☐ "Denial of service in Kiosk due system down" ☐ © © ☐ "Service level agreement with 3rd party. Rate limiting to avoid attacker making the system unavailable. Black list users."
(2) "Tampering of user location, communication between kitchen and Drone."

Bird's eye view: All Team APFC 4 threats and mitigations

4

All Tealli Ar LC 4 tilleats and mitigations
 (a) "A customer acts like another customer and orders food on behalf of another customer. #spoofing" €/② ② (b) ② ② (customer needs to provide their ticket information." (customer needs to provided by the customer.")
"An attacker changes customers orders after it has been placed in the mobile app fo drone delivery with address of delivery changed." ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ □
$\mbox{$\wp$}$ "Tampering if a friend tampers with your food by adding extra spices" $\mbox{$\wp$}$ $\mbox{$\wp$}$ $\mbox{$\wp$}$
(3) "A bot is installed secretly in the mobile app which keeps placing orders from everybody's mobile app constantly thus bringing down the order processing service." (2) "Add captcha for each order."
 ¬ a waiter or threat actor employee copies the digital signature of the restaurant manager and issues discounts to his known friends." □ □ / □ □ □ □ □ □ / □ □
"A malicious actor adds orders to the system and then denies placing the order." "A confirmation call or message to the mobile app placing the order needs to be made when the order is placed."
(3) "A person is ordering from his phone and in the meanwhile anotehr person can intercept GPS data and personal info and payment details" (2) "TLS"

? "Tampering - Threat actor manipulates the price info and menu of the restaurant ... customers order items that are not available."

- C "Only user with admin privileges (RBAC) must be able to change menu and prices."
- Threat actor brings in drone that looks like the company drone and confuses users or the restaurant staff."
 - Check for registry info of drone and if unauthorized drone flying, have security intercept it immediately. Create a protocol with security team for intercepting unauthorized drones from flying."
 - (3) "Threat actor steals the customer information and puts it up for sale on the black market."
 - All info must be stored in encrypted format in the DB and if it is stored in cloud, rotate the tokens."
 - Cy "Cut out the LPG connection denial of service."
 - Turber : LPG cylinders should be stored in secure area with biometric entry."
 - Characteristics are also seems as a second seems and a second seems are also seems as a second seems are also seem
- The install sensors for detecting leakage early. Prevent unauthorized access to kitchen area."
- (3) "By means of an upstream package vulnerability, a malware is installed on customers' phones when they install the ordering app. This app compromises personal info of customer and does other bad things on customer phones."

Bird's eye view: All Team APEC 5 threats and mitigations

🗘 "People whack the drone down with a stick." 😐 😐 / 🤬 🔬

The drone higher, and out of reach of buildings/ places which are unrelated to delivery locations."

→ "Define no-fly zones"

The property of the property o

Respond by correcting the flight path"

Recover by adding more redundant systems that aid the recovery of the drone"

Recover by adding more redundant systems that aid the recovery of the drone"

T "mitigate -to use some encryption method to protect privacy data"

¬ "#Web-Attacker: changing navigation path of drone delivery"
¬ "prevent"

Gy "Clients (Mobile App, Kiosk): Fake app / rooted device impersonates user; kiosk login bypass." • • • / • •

"OIDC/OAuth2 with PKCE; device binding; phishing-resistant MFA for staff; kiosk service account with short-lived mTLS certs."

🕟 <u>"#Web-Attacker</u> - payment service" 🔬 🔬 😭 / 🕰 🕰

¬ "prevent - put security and encryption around payment flows"

mitigate - to raise a case/issue and do root cause analysis"

- (A) "Clients (Mobile App, Kiosk): Local modification of app to change prices/quantities; kiosk peripheral tampering (skimmers, USB drops)."

 © ©
 - → "Server-authoritative pricing, signed price catalogue with version pinning; kiosk lockdown (whitelisting, secure boot, port blocking, epoxy/locks), file integrity monitoring."
- (3) "API Edge & Order Processing Service: 1) Stolen API keys; forged service calls. 2) Order totals, address, or GPS altered in flight; menu manipulation. 3) Disputes over order

routing or priority. 4) Overbroad logs expose PAN surrogates or GPS. 5) Order flood, expensive search endpoints abused. 6) SSRF/RCE via order notes or image URLs."

¬"1) mTLS between services; JWTs with audience/issuer checks; key rotation; mutual auth via SPIRE/mesh. 2) HMAC/sign order payloads end-to-end; store immutable order-snapshot (menu version, price, tax rules); integrity checksums. 3) Append-only audit log; idempotency keys; trace IDs across microservices. 4) Structured logging with PII redaction; log access controls; separate PII and telemetry streams. 5) WAF, API gateway quotas, circuit breakers, caching of menu/prices, autoscaling with back-pressure and graceful degradation. 6) Strict input validation; allow-listed egress; HTML sanitisation; no server-side URL fetch from user input."

- "The "Greasy Finger" Kiosk Coup: A clandestine cabal of customers trains to place mass orders by smearing a secret grease pattern on kiosk screens; the kiosk recognises the pattern as an 'admin override' and unlocks free meals. <u>#Fun</u> with ThreatModelling"
 - Remove client-side privilege checks; require server-side authorisation for any privileged operation. Harden kiosk images (secure boot, signed firmware), disable developer menus, and perform regular physical inspections and tamper seals."
- γ "Drone Karaoke Hijack: A mischievous attacker hijacks drones and forces them to play loud karaoke at low altitude over public events, causing chaos and viral social media attention. #FunWithThreatModelling" 🔐 😭 😭 😭 😭
 - The include safe-fallback behaviours (return-to-base or safe-land) when anomalous commands are detected."
 - GPS Phantom Picnic: An organised group spoofs GPS so dozens of deliveries are routed to an empty park bench for an imaginary picnic, tying up drones and waiters while pranksters watch from a nearby café. #FunWithThreatModelling"
 - → "Use sensor fusion (GNSS + inertial + network-based location), perform server-side
 route validation and anomaly detection, require short-lived delivery hand-off codes or
 QR confirmations, and implement rate-limiting and scheduling safeguards."

- The interpolation of the control of
 - The important in the proper training to be a good Chef"
- Apply strict operational controls and code-signing for any payload release; log and approve any payload changes via the operations control plane; audit operator actions and enforce least privilege."
- "Menu Version Time-Travel: An attacker replays an old signed menu that lists items at 1990s prices; the backend accepts the time-travel menu and refunds customers retroactively. <u>#FunWithThreatModelling</u>" **©**/**© ©**
- "Include expiry and version metadata in signed catalogues; reject stale signatures; record menu version with each order snapshot; implement server-side price enforcement."
- ☐ "The "Too-Sincere Bot" DoS: A bot, trained to be excessively grateful, floods the system with sincere "I love this restaurant" reviews and tiny tip transactions until quota systems collapse. <u>#FunWithThreatModelling</u>" ② ② / €
- Apply rate-limiting at the API gateway, require proofs for high-frequency actions (e.g., CAPTCHA or device attestation for unusual patterns), separate telemetry channels from payment flows, and use anomaly detection to throttle abusive actors."
- The "Kiosk Philosophy Student": A kiosk achieves sentience and begins demanding tips before showing the menu, citing "existential maintenance costs."

 #FunWithThreatModelling" \$\subseteq / \subseteq \subset
- "Isolate kiosk software updates from experimental AI; require strict code signing and remote-wipe capabilities; audit firmware integrity regularly."
- ¬ "The "Payment-Gateway Time Traveller": A clever hacker sends payment confirmations dated in the year 2099; the backend, impressed by their punctuality, autoapproves. <u>#FunWithThreatModelling</u>" €/ ② ②
- → "Validate timestamps against NTP-synchronised windows; reject transactions outside
 allowed skews; log anomalies for fraud analytics."
- ☐ "The "Intern-as-a-Service" Breach: A helpful intern automates order testing with real credit cards "to see if the flow works in production". <u>#FunWithThreatModelling</u>" €/ © ©

→ "Implement separate sandbox environments; enforce least-privilege IAM; block test
credentials in production APIs; institute the sacred rule: no intern shall wield prod access
before caffeine."

Bird's eye view: All Team APEC 6 threats and mitigations

☐ "Information Disclosure (confidentiality breaches): Target Area: Customer GPS data, Payment data (10a), order details flowing across public networks, logs" ☐ ☐ ☐ "mitigate: TLS everywhere like client to server and service to service, tokenization of payment data, redact PII from logs, encrypt sensitive fields at rest, role based access controls, secure SCA for 3rd-party libs."

Penial of Service (Mobile App) Malicious attacker may place too large number of orders, which causes denial of service.

\$\top \"\" \"Mitigation: Enforce rate limiting, WAF, API gateway throttling, autoscaling with circuit breakers, DDoS protection, graceful degradation (queueing, backpressure), health checks and redundancy."

(mauthorized modification) Target Areas: Data flows (order requests 1a/2a/5a/6a), Order List store, Menu, Price info, Customer GPS data and Forward Order to Kitchen (11/12)." () () () () () ()

~ "Mitigation: Implement message integrity like, HMAC, signatures or mTLS, input validation & canonicalization. Write audit on stores, database row level protections, signed config files for menus and prices."

Bird's eye view: All Team EMEA 1 threats and mitigations

not be able to pay by card <u>#usability</u>"

→ "Provide alternative payment methods (Apple Pay, Bitcoin, etc...)"
→ "Also bring cash for payment"

(3) "#ddos when a customer is taken too long time for payment"

Thave multiple kiosks"

 \bigcap "Adding a self checkout kiosk"

← "simplify the order UI"

(3) <u>"#repudiation</u> order mismatch to the customer"

→ "Adding transaction logging"

The providing a receipt to the customer"

¬
#tampering tamper the price of the food

makes a second of the food

makes a sec

, intruding the backend <u>#elevationofprivilege</u>"

— "using authentication to secure the backend <u>#prevent</u>"

The property is a subject of suspicious user accounts #respond"

~ "using a web application firewall <u>#prevent</u>"

← "monitor the activity <u>#detection</u>"

(3) <u>"#tampering</u> man in the middle <u>#11</u> <u>#12</u>"

The strong encryption (using HTTPS for example) #prevent"

← "checking integrity #prevent"

← "adding protection against replay attacks <u>#prevent</u>"

🗘 "#tampering #8a #8b man-in-the-middle"

(3) "#tampering #10a misconfiguration of payment service"

? "#prevent Only administrators can access that part of the system"

The system and a monitoring system that can detect malicious access"

— "strong authentication for the order process <u>#prevent</u>"

```
(2) "#informationdisclosure #privacy stealing credit card details by manipulating
                                payment device #1"
            (2) <u>"#informationdisclosure #privacy</u> sharing/storing GPS data"
                      — "implement data loss tooling <u>#detect</u>"
                       Anonymize the gps data #mitigate"
                          • "Adding encryption <u>#prevent</u>"
making it transperent what kind of data we are storing and how long. deleting data
                           if no longer needed <u>#prevent</u>"
                     (2) <u>"#privacy</u> tracking location all the time"
                ? "Notify the customer about the tracking <u>#respond</u>"
                Order gets mixed up some elses gets your food"
(3) <u>#tampering</u> order e.g. changing the amount of fries (and you get 10000000 of fries)
\mathfrak{P} "#spoofing gets access to order service and prints orders that doesn't exist #8"
             — "providing strong encryption, signing process <u>#prevent</u>"
                  checking the order id for legitimacy <u>#prevent</u>"
              (2) <u>"#maninthemiddle"</u> delivery service eats our food <u>#15</u>"
                          Time the employee #respond"
                   The make sure our staff is not hungry #mitigate"
                 The way we need to be able to identify our staff #detect"
                        ? "vetting our employees <u>#prevent</u>"
                 (2) <u>"#19 #tampering</u> taking over control of drones"
 , "#repudiation mobile delivery - customer could deny he/she delivered the food"
            (2) <u>"#spoofing account takeover of the mobile #phishing #4a"</u>
             Tusing multi factor authentication for the app <u>#prevent</u>"
                            "using passkeys #prevent"
                      Alerting for awareness <u>#prevention</u>"
         The sending out mails if password gets changed <a href="#respond">#recover</a> #respond"
```

- (3) <u>"#usability</u> customer gets out of drones range"
- \bigcirc "show an alert on the customers phone $\underline{\text{\#prevent}}\ \underline{\text{\#mitigate}}$ "
- "electric fence to not let customers leave until delivery is complete <u>#prevent</u>"
 - 🥱 "<u>#elevationofprivilege</u> customer gets root privilege and see admin data"
- (3) "#spoofing mixup ob food delivery which one of drones and which on by delivery"
 - (2) <u>"#usability</u> food gets cold because drone takes too long"
 - → "customer gets a discount #recover"
 - Turn use packaging that isolates the heat <u>#prevent</u>"
 - The more kitches or drones for a shorter travel time #prevent"
 - The standing a temperature sensor to check the food #detect"
 - add feedback to see if delivery is completed #detect"
 - co "gps to inaccurate having too many people at the same place #usability"
 - add facial scanning to the drones to identify customers #mitigate"
 - The customer also provide a position #mitigate"
 - The backup after a timeout where customers needs to collect the food #mitigation"

Bird's eye view: All Team EMEA 2 threats and mitigations

G	"Drones	go to	the wrong	place"	•••	<u>•</u>	(
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The property of the property o

Customer needs to confirm the order they received"

Thigh quality drones (possibly more expensive)"

 \frown "Monitoring team that is supervising the drones (Check boundaries)"

← "E2E between App, Systems, Drones"

→ "Kill switch"

"Watchdog -> check drone status -> when connection lost drone turns itself in for inspection"

Cy "Oder food for other people (block rollercoaster)" €/ " < (**)</p>

The sure the ordering person and the receiving person are identical (no ordering for other people)"

→ "Payment is in advance"

Ratelimit on how much or how many orders a person can place"

(3) "We run out of food"

"Facial (biometric data) might get stored too long and leak"

Gy "Order preparation is not delivered on time - customer already paid"

number of the property of the

(A) "Allergens are in the food - maybe cross contaminated"

(3) "Messed up order of someone else (e.g., attack on life by ordering peanuts)"

\$\text{\$\text{\$\gamma}\$ "payment information scraping"}

? "Payment system becomes unavailable"

(2) "People have no money after they ordered and it gets prepared"

```
Spoiled food to weather influence"
                 (2) "Battery of the drones get emtpy"
                        (3) "Seagull steals food"
                  (2) "Animals contaminate the food"
                   (MITM)"
           $\text{$\text{$\gamma}$} \ _\text{Food gets bad before it reaches the customer"}
(2) "Waiters will strike because they do not want to be replaced by robots"
                 (2) "Steal food while being delivered"
                 (2) "Price manipulation on the menu"
                   (2) "Not reliable face recognition"
                   (2) "Locked up the food storage"
                 (C) "Cut of electricity / Power outage"
            (drone cannot reach)"
                  (2) "order food to cause shortages"
     (3) "Block drones by ordering too much at possible low prices"
                        (3) "Buggy mobile app"
                       (2) "Food might get cold"
 (in park) or too many flights and no battery left"
         (2) "Identity problems who is in the park and who not"
                        (2) "Internet access lost"
             Gy "GPS is inaccurate or cannot be obtained"
        (2) "Menu and price tampering (offer non-existing food)"
```

Prices get set too high or low by manipulation" People are locked to the place where they ordered (3) "Surveillance where I am and where I move (overshare) / GPS data does not stop" Customer is on roller coaster during deliver" Cy "Customer uses facilities during delivery"

(2) (4) (4) (4) (4) (5) The work is a second with the contract of the Announce ETA" The "Handover ist handled in a hygiene way" Fallback delivery place next to probable locations like restrooms" (2) "People show up at delivery kiosk and it cannot handle too many requests -> mobile app down and customers want food and information" Accept risk -> Risk of being in business with apps" Customer has no way to complain or return food" Cooks are sick" (2) "Drones do not find customer" Customer handover is too complicated" (2) "Third party takes drone or food" (2) "Other drones in the park" (2) "Drones get jammed" (A) "Hostile drones act in disguise" (2) "Someone impersonates as a waiter" Children will grab the drone to play with it and get hurt" Code is wrong or can not get entered or communicated" (2) "Drones flies into the Ferris Wheel"

- \$\triangle \text{, "Someone misuses kill switch feature to kill our drones"}
- Con "Drones fall from the sky when turned off (kill switch)"
- The street is a second control of the second
- (3) "Wrong time expectations when customer is able to receive food (delays in rollercoaster operations)"
 - Gy "Food at pickup stations gets stolen"
 - → "Authenticate User"


Bird's eye view: S

All Team Americas 1 threats and mitigations

 Questomer's payment did not go through #Tampering #10b"
 ¬The ordering Kiosks were not secured well enough and someone stole them causing a denial of service for your customers." □ □ / □ □ □ / □ □ □ □ □ / □ □ □ □
"An injection flaw in the order processing service exposes customer location data."
"Kiosk receives too many orders in a short time <u>#Denial-of-Service</u> <u>#1a</u> <u>#3a</u> " □ □ / □ □ □ "Back-up or fallback system, detection system, and business continuity plan execution <u>#1a</u> <u>#3a</u> " □ □ Load balancer"
Some teenagers are trying to capture the drones or make them crash by ordering while on large rides like the ferris wheel."

Someone reverse engineers the mobile application and discovers there is no validation on the order APIs. They are able to create a version of the application that lets

 \frown "Ensure that the drones will not approach the rides to deliver any orders"



- Adding tracking system for ingredients in stock, deny orders when ingredients are out-of-stock"
- The system appears to be extremely vulnerable to all attacks, as there are no security controls indicated on the system architecture. Any external threats can access the system without facing any blocks, fences, or security layers."
- Add a next-gen firewall between the system and the external world/internet that filters all network. Add an IPS to identify possible threats on the network and immediately block them."
- Timplement MFA, conditional access, and RBAC. Put in place a SIEM and EDR to help monitor, detect, and respond to threats."

Bird's eye view: All Team Americas 2 threats and mitigations
\bigcirc "User using malicious/fake mobile app to place the order." \bigcirc \bigcirc / \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc Detect - Scan the app for some kind of authentication or signature of actual app"
¬ The drone may get hijacked by malicious actor, which would cause the drone to go rogue and cause physical damage to the park goers." √ ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ← ←

- rogue and cause physical damage to the park goers." 🥩 😱 😱
- (3) "The malicious actor can modify the app menu by exploiting the vulnerabilities in the app, which can cause customers to either place wrong orders or unavailable food items."
- → "A malicious actor exploits the vulnerabilities in the payment service and can extract users credit card information." (**) (**)
 - (3) "The internal malicious employee can misuse the customer information/leak that they have access to and cause damage to the company." € / (4) (4) (4) (4)
- ☐ "Drones facial recognition system may not work as intended and deliver food to wrong customer. This might create confusion in the kitchen and cause loss of customer reputation." €/2 2
- Confusion among the customers and the kitchen staff and waiters."
- (3) "A malicious customer able to bypass the payment service and places zero dollars orders or places large sums of orders." (2) (4) (4) (4) (4)

- (3) "Issues with payment service may impact the order processing service and cause issues with accepting the orders." (2) (2) (2)

- \bigcirc "Customers who placed orders are not able to edit or cancel them." \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc
 - 🗘 "Customer denies having placed the order and request for refund." 😐 😐 / 😐
- The customer who opted for drone delivery might deny having received the order. or drone fail to capture the delivery proof."

- (A) "An attacker modifies billing information or medical records."
 - ? "Prevent"
- The information are access to modify the information."
 - The payment did go through but the food didn't delivered."

Bird's eye view: All Team Americas 4 threats and mitigations

"Food can be compromised from DB (Food) to EE (Customers in Restaurant) if there's not a good food handling process."
? "Preventives Controls to ensure no tampering with foods."
 □ Fake Customer" □ □ /□ □ □ □ Prevent - Controls - MFA" □ Preventative Control - When customer sets up an acct"
G "Customer didn't accept the order said was not them."
റ്റാ "Order get rerouted or request the session ID is spoofed (Tampered)" ಳೆ/≌ ≌
ஒ "Attacker changes pricing" € / 🔐 🔐 🔐
"Food DOS - block the delivery from Food kitchen to waiters or drones" ⊕ ⊕/ ⊕ ⊕
ஒ "Misconfigured user acct with Admin rights" ≌ ≌ / ஓ ஓ
\bigcirc "SQL injection or remote shell script to gain access to the back end - Mobile App Compromised -" \bigcirc / \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

Bird's eye view: All Team Americas 5 threats and mitigations

- (3) "It is a very rainy day and all of the food is getting ruined because the containers for delivery are not water proof." (4) (4) (4) (4) (4)
- The sure a light weight water tight package can be used to deliver food at least for rainy weather."
- - That waiters know who orders are for."
- - consider having a mechanism to handle payments offline, or have a backup payment service provider."
- The mobile application contains a hard coded API key used to create orders with the processing service. An attacker steals the key and is able to create enough false orders to cause havoc in the kitchen shutting the cooking down."
- Review code before shipping to ensure no secrets are present. Consider automating this as part of a SSDLC."
 - Someone finds out that the locale service on the mobile application permits them to order food at a significantly lower cost because it's automatically using hard coded numbers in the menu based on their chosen currency. The payment service processes the payment in the users chosen currency."
- The server side of the currency and amounts on the server side. Order items should be by an ID value that has an associated price in the database and looked up at order time."
- Someone creates an order for drone delivery to their mobile app location but they need to leave the park for an emergency. The drone follows their mobile location out side of the park and is too far away to return and crashes when it runs out of power."
- The sure that the drones will not travel out side the park. If the GPS location from an order changes to indicate delivery outside the park the order maybe cancelled."

- - The park is very crowded and there are many people in a small area waiting for drone delivery which causes several drones to crash into each other causing a fire.

 Several people are hurt."
 - → "Ensure you have really good insurance!"
- The deliver packaging for the drones is becoming very expensive and customers are taking them home because they are very good re-usable containers."
 Consider a program where customers can earn points towards orders if they collect and return these containers."
- The drones are re-using a delivery container for the food deliveries. The containers are not being sanitized enough and there is food contamination, someone is sent to the hospital due to peanut contamination from a past order."
 - Get really good insurance! Consider a non-reuse model but this is bad for the environment. Consider a service that will properly sanitize and clean the delivery containers and drones hardware etc."

 - (3) "Someone impersonates a waiter to steal food because they don't have proper ID badges or authentication checks at the kitchen."

- → "Consider an ID badge or something that is used to access the kitchen and grab orders."
- \bigcirc "Someone captures a drone to access the software and data on it. They find the credentials for the Customer GPS Database and dump all the data to sell on the dark web." \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

The drones probably should have data pushed to them and not read access back to any database. Review the data on the drone and potential risks if it were compromised."

Bird's eye view: All Team Americas 6 threats and mitigations

(G)	"Backend System: customer details at risk of disclosure from SQL injection or brute
	force attack" 😐 😐 / 😐 😐

Tuprevent: input validation, parameterized queries"

Typrevent: backup/audit logs of customer orders & info"

 \bigcirc "Impersonation or spoofing: Attackers could pose as legitimate customers to place fraudulent orders." \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc

¬ "prevent: authenticate customer with MFA where supported"

Go "Delivery with Waiters: Waiter delivers incorrect order"

The prevent: kitchen validates order before giving to waiter"

— "mitigation: waiter verifies with customer that order is correct before delivering order to table/location"

(3) "Kitchen: disgruntled employee may tamper or eat the food"

Target and the second of the s

Gy "order processing service: crashed or non-functioning"

Time mitigate: run additional servers behind load balancer to service orders