# Threat Modeling

Start where you are now



# ₭ The path to threat modeling

In order to detect design errors in applications, many companies have found that static (SAST) and dynamic (DAST) security analysis tools are simply not enough. The failures found with these tools account for over half the security flaws detected when an application goes through into production, which are often the most expensive to correct in terms of resources and time invested. This is the reason why over the past few years many security teams are trying to adopt a shift left approach that goes further within the development cycle.

# ₭ But what is threat modeling?

Threat Modeling takes place in the design phase of a system or application. It focuses on using abstractions to help think and assess risks effectively. Gartner<sup>1</sup> frames this activity within the ASRTM (Application Security Requirements and Threat Management) category, focused on automating the definition of security requirements, risk assessment and Threat Modeling.

## ✓ Where do I start?

Implementing a security program that includes Threat Modeling involves a cultural and organizational change rather than a technical change. We want to avoid that this change has a paralyzing effect, so to get started here are some strategies that can help in this transition.

### 1. Communicate change and involve people

Any Threat Modeling tool should be a collaborative tool. Collaboration is based on trust, which means explaining what we are going to do and why it is in every stakeholders interest to do so. The first objective is to communicate the organizational change needed. This involves adapting the corporate development procedures to include Threat Modeling once the application architecture is defined. If it is not written in the procedures and approved by the PMO, it doesn't exist.

#### 2. Start small

Don't be ambitious, it is important to start small for two main reasons: firstly, to overcome resistance to change; secondly so you can be sure you have enough resources to maintain the new Threat Modeling service. If you are going to ask other areas to get involved but you are not able to give an adequate response time, you run the risk of dying of success. We all know that it is often far easier to promote a new initiative than to revive a dead one. Start with a pilot approach, take a set of applications, and then grow from there.

References

<sup>[1]</sup> 2017 Hype Cycle for Data Security, https://www.gartner.com/doc/3772083

## 3. Establish risk-based security pathways

Not all applications are the same or have the same business value. Without a corporatelevel understanding of risk appetite, it is not possible to establish a risk-based security strategy to improve the resources that are available.

A Threat Modeling tool can help you manage your resources more efficiently so you can make better decisions. An example of this could be the definition of different security pathways for applications based on a preliminary risk assessment. If it is an internal application based on a corporate archetype which has the approval from security, it may be enough to do security tests in pre-production.

#### Define the threat path

On the other hand, if an application handles card and customer data, it would be reasonable to require a path in which static code security analysis, unit security control tests, and external security tests are carried out before going into production.

We can define these paths manually, though it is far more useful to automate the process so the project manager can obtain the security pathways for his application without directly involving the security team. An example of this type of initiative with IriusRisk<sup>2</sup> is shown in Figure 1.

New project		
Project details	Product Requirements 🛛 🗮 Customization Tab 🛛 🗮 VZ Questionnaire 🖉 External Documen	itation
Name*		
Reference ID*		
Tags		
Description	Ø Q	
Project Owner Email	email@company.com	
Application Type	Medical Device × Web Service ×	
Deployment TrustZone	DMZ × Intranet × V	
What is the tentative Release Date to Production	29/03/2023 15:34:51	
Does the application process cardholder date?	Yes 🗸	
Does the application process personally identifiable data?	Yes 🗸	
User Email Field		

Figure 1.

Based on the answers of the project manager, the Threat Modeling tool will automatically generate the necessary tasks in the ALM tool so that traceability of the defined security path is ensured.

References

<sup>[2]</sup> IriusRisk - Threat Modeling Tool, https://www.iriusrisk.com/threat-modeling-platform

## 4. Automate the delivery security requirements

Security requirements must exist outside the security team. They should be published, challenged, improved and adapted to the agreed business risk appetite and regulatory compliance needs.

IriusRisk can automatically generate threat models and its associated security requirements, without having to rely on a security analyst. For this, the development team must define the architecture of the application. There are mainly two (nonexclusive) ways of achieving this. The first is to draw a diagram of the components, assets as shown in the example in *Figure 2*.




Figure 2.

A second strategy is to define the architecture with a questionnaire that will complement the visual orientation of the diagram, to establish a granularity in the model that allows more relevant threats and their countermeasures to be extracted. In *Figure 3* you can see an example of a form in which you can observe that by adding the details about the assets of the architecture, the standards defined in the security policies are automatically applied.

Policy Sets	Standards	Assets	Server	IAM	Secret management	Session Management	Data Transport	Features	Languages/ Frameworks	< >		
Which STRID	E category of th	reats apply t	o this comp	onent?								
1 - Spoo		Attacks	Attacks that spoof things like identity, actions, etc.									
2 - Tampering			Tamper	ring and	manipulation of Inputs, pr	otocols and resources, for e	example.					
3 - Repudiation			Manipu	lation of	information, such as audi	t logs.						
4 - Info	ure	Attacks	that foc	us on obtaining information	on, such as interception.							
5 - Den		Preven	Preventing access to a service through methods such as abuse of resources, or flooding access paths to a location.									
			Methods of accessing sensitive resources through gaining access to elevated privileges (such as admin access.)									
6 - Elev	ation of Privileo	e	Method	ls of acco	essing sensitive resources	through gaining access to	elevated privileges (	such as admin	access.)			
6 - Elev	ation of Privileç	le	Method	Is of acco	essing sensitive resources	through gaining access to	elevated privileges (	such as admin	access.)			

Figure 3.

Finally, as shown in Figure 4, the development team can autonomously obtain a set of security requirements that can be automatically (and bidirectionally) synchronized with an ALM tool.

lr	usRis!«	Pro	jects / Web Server Tem	plate							
-		Threats									
		÷	· <b>*</b> · ● · ▼	~ C	E						
			Components & Use Cases	¢	Threat	¢	Curr. Risk 🔶	Risk Resp. 🔶			
Web	Server Template		▼ 🍞 Web UI								
web.	server remplate		▼ (9) Threats								
			* 🔁 General								
	t model				An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers		<u>~</u>				
							_				
Ŵ	Threats				Application contains security vulmerabilities not identifed during the development process		*				
⊞	Countermeasures				Attackers gain unauthorised access to data by compromising third party web resources		^				
	Artifacts				Attackers gain unauthorised access to data or services by accessing a dient side secret		^				
	Notifications				Attackers gain unauthorised access to the application by the use of deprecated cient-side technologics		~				
General Info			Read or Post dat	a							
0	Details	-0									
0	Project component	-	hreat Details 🗮 MS	RC	STRIDE Comments Audit log 🚺 Issue Tracker						
*	Ownership	Cres	sted by rules engine								
-		Name	*	An advers	sry embeds malicious scriots in content that will be served to web browser v input to exporter	countermeasures d activities, intents or con	tent providers is	not validaded			
.ì	Reports				Velidate all dat						
Ð	Versions	Refer	ence ID*	CAPEC-63							
	Audit log	Impai	npacts Confidential		ity Integrity Availability						
₽	Settings			= Media	im 🗸 🗖 Medium 🗖 None 🗸						
				Ease of Exp	oitation						
				Low							
		Issue	ID								
		Descr	iption	browser, 1 browser, 1 type expl	ary embeds maliciouse scripts in content that will be served to web he goal of the stack is for the target software, the client-side o exclude the script with the surs' sprivilege level. An attack of this sits a program's vulnerabilities that are brought to thy allowing remote secule code and scripts. We browsers, hor exempts have some simple						

Figure 4.

# ₭ Measure to improve

Metrics will help you assess if you are doing a good job and make it easier to pinpoint what you are not yet doing and why. Security metrics should be handled like any other quality indicator of software artifacts. This makes it easier to spread a security culture and make security a global contribution of all the teams involved in the development cycle. Figure 5 shows an example of risk metrics associated with the assets involved in the Threat Modeling of an application.




Figure 5.

Automate Threat Modeling to fit your existing SDLC.

Secure design right from the start.

Request a demo

